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I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing numbers of children are conceived through donor-assisted
conception utilizing donated gametes, especially donated sperm.1 Despite
the fact that using donated sperm is one of the most ancient forms of fertility
treatment, it has traditionally been shrouded in secrecy, perhaps because it is
used most commonly to redress problems of a husband’s infertility through
the use of donated semen.2 However, the unabated advance of medical
science (exemplified by the development of DNA testing) is altering the
tradition of secrecy.3 The relative ease with which it is now possible to
discover the identity of a person’s genetic parents, the open identification
policy with regard to adoption, and the development of genetic testing for
disorders have all dramatically influenced the development of human rights
law in favor of the child’s right to know the truth about his or her genetic
makeup.4 A growing body of research, largely conducted in the adoption
field, supports the argument that knowledge of one’s genetic background is
crucial to the development of a sense of identity or self.5 Despite the fact
1

JANE FORTIN, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING LAW 470 (3d ed. 2009). Egg
donation is not as successful or as simple a process. Additionally, the cost of donor
conception utilizing donor eggs and the acute shortage of egg donors further complicate use of
donated eggs. Kamal K. Ahuja et al., Egg Sharing and Egg Donation: Attitudes of British
Egg Donors and Recipients, 12 HUM. REPROD. 2845 (1997).
2
FORTIN, supra note 1, at 471. The procedure itself dates to 1884, when the first donor
insemination case was reported. Eric Blyth, Donor Anonymity and Secrecy Versus Openness
Concerning the Genetic Origins of the Offspring: International Perspectives, 2 JEWISH MED.
ETHICS 4 (2006).
3
See Eric Blyth & Lucy Frith, Donor-Conceived People’s Access to Genetic and
Biographical History: An Analysis of Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting
Disclosure of Donor Identity, 23 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 174, 175 (2009) (discussing bans on
donor anonymity). Eleven developed, democratic countries have prohibited anonymous
gamete donation and established systems to assist donor-conceived people, even children,
identify their donors since 1985. Id. The jurisdictions include Austria, England, Finland, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Wales, and the Australian states of
New South Wales, Victoria, and Western Australia. Id. at 177. Generally, access to
identifying information is limited to offspring only. Id. Austria is the only country that
allows children as young as fourteen to have access to this information. Id. at 179. Generally
the age is sixteen or above, although some countries provide for exceptions in certain cases,
such as when a donor-conceived child is born with a congenital disability. Id. at 179–80.
4
Tabitha Freeman & Martin Richards, DNA Testing and Kinship: Paternity, Genealogy
and the Search for the ‘Truth’ of Genetic Origins, in KINSHIP MATTERS 67, 75 (Fatemeh
Ebtehaj et al. eds., 2006).
5
See, e.g., Katherine O’Donovan, Interpretations of Children’s Identity Rights, in
REVISITING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 73, 75 (Deirdre Fottrell ed., 2000) (reporting on a study of
Aboriginal children and the negative effects of policies that ignored their identity); see also
Geraldine Hewitt, Missing Links: Identity Issues of Donor-Conceived People, J. FERTILITY
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that the analogy of donor conception to adoption is somewhat controversial,6
the use of rights-based arguments to endorse the position that children
conceived by donor sperm should have access to identifying information
about their gamete donor has gained credence and is now a commonly
expressed argument.7
The ability of donor-conceived children to access information about their
genetic origins initially depends on their awareness of the nature of their
conception.8 Without this knowledge, such children will assume that their
“social” fathers are their genetic parents.9 Hence, the onus of revealing the
manner of conception rests on the social parents, unless such information is
disclosed by the state, such as through a birth certificate,10 or it is obvious
that they cannot be the biological children of their social father.11 Concerns
COUNSELING, Autumn 2002, at 14, 19 (noting that “of the 47 donor-conceived people who
took part in this study, only 3 had not experienced identity issues” and the other forty-four
persons indicated that their identity issues related to “their conception through anonymous
donor sperm”).
6
Ilke Turkmendag et al., The Removal of Donor Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of
Claims by Would-Be Parents, 22 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 283, 286, 289 (2008).
7
Lucy Frith, Beneath the Rhetoric: The Role of Rights in the Practice of Non-Anonymous
Gamete Donation, 15 BIOETHICS 473, 473 (2001).
8
See Rebecca Probert, Families, Assisted Reproduction and the Law, 16 CHILD & FAM.
L.Q. 273, 287 (2004) (stating that a child’s right to know their origins only has meaning if the
parents have a duty to disclose, and such a duty could be found in recording requirements like
on a more “flexible” birth certificate updated throughout life that remains private until the
child reaches the age of maturity).
9
A ‘social parent’ is “a genetically unrelated parent, but it can also refer . . . to a person
who assumes the care and responsibilities usually associated with parenthood.” Leanne
Smith, Is Three a Crowd? Lesbian Mothers’ Perspective on Parental Status in Law, 18 CHILD.
& FAM. L.Q. 231, 232 (2006). Traditionally in England, relationships in a social family took
precedence over biological ties. Id. at 232–33. Courts only consider interfering in presumed
legitimacy in order to pursue the genetic truth about parenthood in cases where a marriage had
already dissolved. Id. By contrast, the modern English judiciary has generally “become a
champion for the cause of genetic [parenthood].” Id. at 235.
10
The English government has not followed up on numerous suggested birth certificate
changes that would alert donor-conceived children to their status and genetic parentage. Blyth
& Frith, supra note 3, at 185–86. The Joint Committee in their recommendations on the draft
Human Tissue and Embryos Bill expressed deep concern at this omission, commenting that
the authorities “may be colluding in a deception.” JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE HUMAN TISSUE
AND EMBRYOS (DRAFT) BILL, HUMAN TISSUE AND EMBRYOS (DRAFT) BILL, VOLUME I REPORT,
2006-7, H.L. 169-I, H.C. 630-I, para. 276 [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT].
11
Whilst acknowledging the importance of allowing donor-conceived children access to
information about their genetic background, the English government argued that it was
preferable to educate parents “about the benefits of telling children that they were donorconceived rather than forcing the issue through the annotation of birth certificates.”
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE REPORT FROM THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON THE HUMAN TISSUE AND EMBRYOS (DRAFT) BILL, 2007, Cm. 7209, para. 69
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have been expressed about low levels of parental disclosure.12 A study
conducted in 2002 indicated that as few as 5% of parents of donor-conceived
children had told their near-adolescent children about their conception
origins.13 Even that number may be high as reported disclosure rates are
likely to be overestimated because some non-respondents do not participate
due to privacy issues and fears of revealing their use of donor conception.14
The low rate of disclosure may change as the United Nations Committee
on the Rights of the Child puts increasing pressure on national systems that
withhold information about the identities of biological fathers from children
born by donor conception.15 Although legislative changes removing donor
anonymity may play a part in facilitating parental disclosure,16 a parental
decision not to reveal the truth to a donor-conceived child is a complex
family matter and therefore very difficult to regulate by law. Furthermore, in
Europe, such intervention could arguably be construed as a violation of
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which
guarantees the right to privacy and family life, inter alia, subject to justifiable
state intervention.17

[hereinafter RESPONSE TO DRAFT BILL]. However, it has agreed to keep the issue under
review. Id. para. 70.
12
See Claes Gottlieb et al., Disclosure of Donor Insemination to the Child: The Impact of
Swedish Legislation on Couples’ Attitudes, 15 HUM. REPROD. 2052, 2052 (2000) (noting that a
majority of Swedish parents who utilized donor conception did not inform their children
despite the fact that under the Swedish law children could not learn this except by parental
disclosure); RICHARD J. BLAUWHOFF, FOUNDATIONAL FACTS, RELATIVE TRUTHS: A
COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY ON CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO KNOW THEIR GENETIC ORIGINS 290–96,
302–05 (2009) (discussing the position in France, Germany, and Portugal); see generally
Ellen Waldman, What Do We Tell the Children?, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 517 (2006) (discussing
the position in the United States).
13
Susan Golombok et al., Families with Children Conceived by Donor Insemination: A
Follow Up at Age Twelve, 73 CHILD DEV. 952, 966 (2002) (noting that two out of thirty-seven
children surveyed had been told their genetic origins). An earlier study suggested that few
(4%) planned to tell and a further 1% were undecided. Gottlieb et al., supra note 12, at 2053.
14
See Gottlieb at al., supra note 12, at 2052, 2054 (noting that higher rates of revelation
were likely in the group of parents that responded to the questionnaire and that prior to
Swedish legislation in 1985 all donors were anonymous and unable to be traced, and the
mother and nonbiological father were encouraged not to inform anyone about the donation).
15
U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Rights of the Child: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, paras. 31–32,
CRC/C/15/Add.188 (Oct. 9, 2002) [hereinafter U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child: UK].
16
E. Lycett et al., School-Aged Children of Donor Insemination: A Study of Parents’
Disclosure Patterns, 20 HUM. REPROD. 810, 811 (2005).
17
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
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This Article argues that, although the data regarding open adoption
appears promising, policy makers should be wary of a wholesale transfer of
the analogous lessons from adoption policy to the world of donor
insemination. Before embracing such a wholesale change in legal policies,
this Article argues that there should be a careful assessment of the adoption
analogy and examination of empirical evidence about children born through
gamete donation in various countries. In order to reach this conclusion,
Part II of this Article examines international jurisprudence regarding donor
anonymity. Part III of this Article presents a comparative study of the policy
regarding anonymous donation in France, Sweden, England, and the United
States. Part IV then presents arguments for nondisclosure of donors, whereas
Part V discusses the arguments for disclosure. Finally, Part VI recommends
a nuanced approach to considering the varied interests and rights of all
family members that gives adequate weight to the collective family interests
and rights of all parties, including those of the would-be parents and sperm
donor.18
II. INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS?
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and the
European Court of Human Rights are two of the international bodies
concerned with producing guidelines and enforcing international laws
regarding right to know one’s origins. The United Nations Committee on the
Rights of the Child is in charge of monitoring the enforcement of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),19 while the European
Court of Human Rights is in charge of reviewing national decisions based on
the ECHR.20 This Part of the Article focuses on the jurisprudence
surrounding the interpretation of the CRC and the ECHR, and how those
interpretations have influenced European developments.
18

Cf. Elizabeth Siberry Chestney, Note, The Right to Know One’s Genetic Origin: Can,
Should, or Must a State That Extends This Right to Adoptees Extend an Analogous Right to
Children Conceived with Donor Gametes?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 365 (2001). This article describes
how recent Tennessee and Oregon statutes granting adoptees the right to know their genetic
parents have withstood challenges under state and federal constitutions and questions whether
a similar right should be granted to donor-conceived children by arguing that a child’s bestinterest analysis supports the right to discover the identity of their genitors. Id. at 369–74.
Chestney asserts that such statutes would withstand constitutional attack in the United States.
Id. at 390.
19
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 43(1), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC].
20
ECHR, supra note 17, art. 19.
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A. Interpretation of the CRC
In 1989, the CRC was drafted as the first legally binding international
instrument to incorporate the full range of human rights—civil, cultural,
economic, political, and social—to protect children (defined as persons under
the age of eighteen).21 By ratifying the CRC, States Parties commit
themselves to protecting and ensuring children’s rights and developing
actions and policies to promote the best interests of the child. However,
none of the articles in the CRC specifically promote a child’s right to
knowledge of his or her origins.22
The United Nations established the Committee on the Rights of the Child
to monitor the rights granted by the CRC, but failed to provide the
Committee with enforcement powers and, further, there is no mechanism for
individual petition under the CRC.23
Article 7 of the CRC states:
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a
nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be
cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights
in accordance with their national law and their obligations
under the relevant international instruments in this field, in
particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.24

21

See generally CRC, supra note 19. The CRC sets out these rights in fifty-four articles
and two optional protocols, which spell out the basic human rights that children should have—
the right: to survival; to develop to the fullest; to protection from harmful influences, abuse,
and exploitation; and to participate fully in family, cultural, and social life, essential for the
human dignity and harmonious development of every child. Id.; Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,
G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (entered into force Feb. 12, 2002); Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (entered into
force Jan. 18, 2002).
22
Douglas Hodgson, The International Legal Protection of the Child’s Right to a Legal
Identity and the Problem of Statelessness, 7 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 255, 265 (1993).
23
Samantha Besson, Enforcing the Child’s Rights to Know Her Origins: Contrasting
Approaches Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention
on Human Rights, 21 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 137, 150 (2007).
24
CRC, supra note 19, art. 7.
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The Committee has interpreted Article 7 as granting a child’s right to
knowledge of his or her origins.25 Further, it has consistently criticized
nations that do not allow for such a right or that allow mothers to give birth
anonymously, as in France,26 and made recommendations to contracting
States Parties regarding incomplete national enforcement of the child’s right
to know his or her origins.27 However, national authorities have a degree of
discretion, provided they do not give higher priority to parental rights than
children’s rights and do not “diverge in their interpretations of the scope and
degree of the duties imposed by [the CRC].”28
In the context of the right to know, the reference to parents could indicate
a right to know one’s biological parents since it is possible to interpret
Article 7 broadly so that the term “parents” includes not only social or legal
parents, but also biological and gestational parents. Furthermore, if Article 7
is read in the light of the rest of the CRC, in particular Articles 9 and 18, it
would appear to guarantee the child’s right to have a relationship with her
parents, but it is not entirely clear what the right to know and be cared for by
one’s parents would entail.29 It might imply the right to contact them as well
as knowledge of their identity. On the one hand, it might be argued that
there should be legislation imposing this obligation on family relationships,
and that such an obligation should be based on a model of scientifically
derived genetic truth. On the other hand, it could be maintained that the right
to know one’s origins is simply a fashionable notion fueled by advances in
biomedical sciences.30 Clearly the biological model of parenthood cannot
rank as highly as other types of parenthood, such as those arising from active
caring, nurturing, and love. Like the right to know, the right to be cared for

25

Besson, supra note 23.
Id. at 153–54.
27
U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Rights of the Child: Denmark, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.33 (Feb. 15, 1995) [hereinafter
U.S. Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Denmark]; U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Norway, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.23 (Apr. 25, 1994) [hereinafter U.S. Comm. on the Rights of the Child:
Norway]; U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child: UK, supra note 15.
28
Besson, supra note 23.
29
See CRC, supra note 19, arts. 9(3), 18 (demanding that states respect the right of children
separated from one or more parents to maintain relationships with each and recognizing the
common responsibilities of parents in child rearing).
30
See generally Carol Smart, Law and the Regulation of Family Secrets, 24 INT’L J.L.
POL’Y & FAM. 397 (2010) (highlighting the potential negative effects stemming from
knowledge of genetic origins).
26
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by one’s biological parents, besides one’s social parents, is always qualified
by the words “as far as possible.”31
Article 8 states:
States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to
preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and
family relations as recognized by law without unlawful
interference. . . . Where a child is illegally deprived of some or
all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall
provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to
re-establishing speedily his or her identity.32
Article 8 was originally proposed in order to deal with the abuses
committed by the military regime in Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s,
which abducted infants from their mothers before their births had been
registered and illegally gave them to couples associated with the armed
forces and the police.33 However, during the drafting process of the CRC,
many countries opposed Article 8’s emphasis on the child’s identity and its
inconsistency with secret adoption and protecting the identity of gamete
donors.34 As a result, a political compromise was reached.35 The provision
was retained with the addition of a few provisos, such as “without unlawful
interference,” “illegally,” or “as recognized by law.”36 “Lawful” is
understood to encompass national as well as international legal norms, so
that national legal restrictions will not be permitted to contradict
international obligations.37
Article 8 does not define the concept of identity. Instead, it gives three
examples of what identity includes: nationality, name, and family relations.38
Knowledge of one’s family relations is usually interpreted as going beyond
knowing one’s legal parents and extending to biological and birth parents.39
31

CRC, supra note 19, art. 7.
Id. art. 8.
33
BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 52–53.
34
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE
“TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” 293 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992) [hereinafter A GUIDE TO THE
“TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES”].
35
See id. (noting deliberations between several countries regarding the language to be used
in Article 8).
36
CRC, supra note 19, art. 8.
37
A GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES,” supra note 34.
38
CRC, supra note 19, art. 8.
39
Andrew Bainham presents a logical argument in favor of this approach. See Andrew
Bainham, Parentage, Parenthood and Parental Responsibility: Subtle, Elusive Yet Important
32
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Article 8 implies duties to register and preserve data regarding a child’s
identity and to make that data accessible to the child.40 It emphasizes
positive duties of assistance by referring to states “undertaking to preserve”
the child’s identity and calling for appropriate measures to reestablish the
child’s identity.41 Another guiding principle may be found in Article 3 of the
CRC, which makes the child’s best interest a primary consideration,
imposing limits on the right to know in cases where the information would
be blatantly contrary to the child’s best interests.42 The United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child appears to interpret the CRC as
bestowing a clear right to donor-conceived children to knowledge of their
genetic identity.43 However, no convincing research been done to indicate
that the enforcement of such a right is as beneficial for donor-conceived
children as it is for adopted children.44 Additionally, if children have a right
to know their genetic origins, then from a Hohfeldian perspective, a
corresponding duty should rest on the parent or the state to inform the
child.45 That specific right appears to be lacking in the framework of the
CRC.
Neither Article 7 nor Article 8 settles the issue of which among the
child’s interests should prevail in case of conflict between her interest to
know her origins and her other interests. Nor do they provide any criteria as
to how to balance the child’s interests with those of others in case of conflict.
Thus the provisions of the CRC relating explicitly to the child’s identity do
not directly offer any protection to the child’s individual identity.46
Distinctions, in WHAT IS A PARENT? A SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS 25, 37–38 (Andrew Bainham
et al. eds., 1999).
40
CRC, supra note 19, art. 8.
41
Id.
42
Article 3 of the CRC provides that the best interests of children must be the primary
concern in making decisions that may affect children. Id. art. 3. All adults should do what is
best for children. When adults make decisions, they should think about how their decisions
will affect children. This particularly applies to budgetary, policy, and legal decisions.
43
U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Denmark, supra note 27; U.N. Comm. on the
Rights of the Child: Norway, supra note 27; U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child: UK,
supra note 15.
44
See Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 290 (describing that most studies are in the
context of adopted children and that the ones that are specific to donor offspring are
methodologically flawed).
45
See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919)
(presenting Hohfeld’s perspective that every right should have a correlative duty, a
perspective that has dominated much of the jurisprudential discussion of rights).
46
Ya’ir Ronen, Redefining the Child’s Right to Identity, 18 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 147,
160 (2004).
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Moreover, the preamble to the CRC appears to envisage a social family,
which succors the inner psychological sense of well-being of a donorconceived child.47 It refers to the fact that countries that have ratified the
CRC have accepted the obligations that the CRC imposes on states to take
account of the significance of traditional and cultural family values “for the
protection and harmonious development of the child.”48 The well-being of
the child would thus appear to be the main object of the CRC, rather than a
bald focus on the child’s right to identity, although the two concepts are
clearly linked. Furthermore, Article 20 states that, when children are
deprived of their family environment, whether or not it be for their own best
interest, “due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s
upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic
background.”49 Finally, Article 5 of the CRC states that “States Parties shall
respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable,
the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local
custom . . . to provide . . . appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise
by the child of the rights recognized in the [CRC].”50
Overall it would appear that, despite the interpretation of the United
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, the formulation of the CRC is
in fact open-ended and can accommodate interpretations such as a child’s
socio-legal parentage, religious, and cultural identities. Other human rights
documents in the United Nations framework and substantive provisions of
the CRC further that interpretation.51
47

Id.
Id. (quoting CRC, supra note 19, art. 18(2)).
49
CRC, supra note 19, art. 20. Children who cannot be looked after by their own family
have a right to special care and must be looked after properly, by people who respect their
ethnic group, religion, culture, and language. Id.
50
Id. art. 5. Article 5 of the CRC provides that governments should respect the rights and
responsibilities of families to direct and guide their children so that, as they grow, they learn
to use their rights properly. Helping children to understand their rights does not mean pushing
them to make choices with consequences that they are too young to handle. Article 5
encourages parents to deal with rights issues “in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child.” Id. The CRC does not take responsibility for children away from
their parents and give more authority to governments. It does, however, place on governments
the responsibility to protect and assist families in fulfilling their essential role as nurturers of
children. Id.
51
BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 58; see also Council of Eur. Comm. of Experts on Family
Law, Report on Principles Concerning the Establishment and Legal Consequences of Parentage
– “The White Paper,” at 7 (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsettin
g/family/CJ-FA_2006_4e%20Revised%20White%20Paper.pdf. This White Paper “reflect[s] a
balance between ‘the biological truth’, reflecting primarily biological and genetic parentage, and
‘the social parenthood’, reflecting . . . with whom the child is living and who is taking care of
48
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B. The European Court of Human Rights: A Holistic Approach?
It is arguable that the greater balance demonstrated in the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights correlates more closely to that of the
original intention of the drafters of the CRC. Both the European Court of
Human Rights and the original drafters of the CRC recognized the
importance of cultural and social inheritance and a stable family to a child.
Article 8(2) of the ECHR expressly acknowledges the possibility that it may
be necessary to restrict the right to know one’s origins when it conflicts with
other rights and outlines the conditions and balancing guidelines that should
be respected.52 The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
has also maintained that the right of a donor-conceived child to know his or
her identity is not absolute.53 Arguably, a state’s positive duties resulting
from the right to know one’s origins are best determined by national efforts
to balance that right against the rights of other parties.54 This Court respects
the state’s margin of appreciation when balancing rights55 and provides
him or her.” Id. The commentary specifically states that, in certain situations, the child’s best
interests may justify withholding information regarding his or her origins. Id. at 31. The
Council of Europe Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Progress in the Biomedical Sciences
affirms that donor anonymity should be maintained more generally, but certain exceptions
should permit the child access to donor information. Council of Eur. Ad Hoc Comm. of Experts
on Progress in the Biomedical Scis., Report on Human Artificial Procreation (1989) [hereinafter
Report on Human Artificial Procreation], available at http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/healthbioethic/so
urce/PMAprinciplesCAHBI1989_en.doc (affirming Principle 28 of the White Paper that donor
anonymity should be maintained). The health of the child is mentioned as a factor that could
require a waiver of donor anonymity, but there is no indication of who should disclose the
identifying information to the child in these circumstances. Id.
52
Besson, supra note 23. But cf. CRC, supra note 19, art. 8(2) (stating that “[w]here a
child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties
shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his
or her identity,” and suggesting a narrower right to know).
53
Besson, supra note 23.
54
See Paul Mahoney, Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?,
19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 3 (1998) (noting the inference that where there is a wide but legitimate
range of opinion on a subject, the ECHR drafters intended a democratic resolution at the
national level). In particular, Mahoney points to the danger to democratic orders should the
European Court of Human Rights allow persons to gain rights in Strasbourg via judicial
interpretation that they have been unable to obtain democratically and legislatively in their
own country. Id.
55
Id. Margin of appreciation implies that, “[b]y reason of their direct and continuous
contact with . . . their countries, State authorities are . . . in a better position than the
international judge[s] to give an opinion on the exact content of the[ ] requirements” of the
European Convention on Human Rights, “as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or
‘penalty’ intended to meet them.” Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
para. 48 (1976). “Where the law and practice differ widely among the Contracting States,
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particularly broad determinative powers in matters pertaining to private life
and identity when there is no consensus among state parties.56 Private life
and the nature of the state’s obligation will depend on the particular aspect of
private life that is at issue.57 For a long time, the court respected the national
margin of appreciation in the case of violations of the right to know one’s
origins.58
In Nylund v. Finland, the European Court of Human Rights held that,
since a mother and her husband believed a paternity test would disturb their
family relationship, it was fully justifiable for the courts of Finland to give
more weight to the interests of the child and the family unit than to the
interests of the applicant’s father in establishing the biological truth of his
paternity, even when he claimed that it was also in the child’s best interest.59
The European Court of Human Rights suggested that after reaching the age
individual countries will, as a result, be afforded a wider margin of appreciation by the
[European Court of Human Rights].” Brian Tobin, Same-Sex Couples and the Law: Recent
Developments in the British Isles, 23 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 309, 317 (2009). However, the
margin of appreciation should not be confused with the discretionary area, which is the
freedom of action open to institutions such as Parliament from domestic courts. Wade K.
Wright, The Tide in Favour of Equality: Same-Sex Marriage in Canada and England and
Wales, 20 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 249, 275 (2006).
56
Schalk v. Austria, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 46 (2010). In Schalk v. Austria, the European
Court of Human Rights acknowledged that there had been major social changes in the nature
of marriage since the adoption of the ECHR, but held that there was still no consensus in the
matter. Id. para. 58. Thus, the court refused to undertake a dynamic interpretation of the
ECHR in the belief that it should not be hasty to substitute its own judgment for those of
national states. Id. para. 62. See generally Masha Antokolskaia, Harmonisation of
Substantive Family Law in Europe: Myths and Reality, 22 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 397 (2010)
(noting the common background of European nations regarding family law, the current
division on that issue, and the European Court of Human Rights’ treatment of the margin of
appreciation in light of the presence or absence of consensus).
57
The margin focuses on the consensus that prevails in Convention signatory States and is
not concerned with the position in an individual Convention State. Nicholas Bamforth, “The
Benefits of Marriage in All but Name?” Same-Sex Couples and the Civil Partnership Act
2004, 19 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 133, 143 (2007).
58
This flexible approach was evident in Mikulic v. Croatia, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. In this
case, the mother of a five-year-old girl claimed on her daughter’s behalf that the fact that her
daughter had no means of forcing a putative father to submit himself to DNA testing violated
her right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR since there was no independent authority
to which she could submit her paternity claim. Id. paras. 8, 47, 56, 64. The European Court
held that the right to private life should include the determination of the legal relationship
between an extramarital child and her natural father. Id. paras. 53–55. Croatia needed to put
in place procedures to allow her, without unnecessary delay, to obtain certain knowledge of
her personal identity. Id. paras. 64–65. However, the Court stressed that in each case it is
important to strike a balance, recognizing that the father also has a right to privacy that entitles
him to avoid forced DNA testing. Id. para. 65.
59
Nylund v. Finland, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. (located under heading “The Law” pt. 2(a)).
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of fifteen the child would be able to decide for herself whether or not she
wished to institute paternity proceedings.60 The result of this case indicates
that the European Court has, in the past, recognized that legal certainty and
the continuity of a stable family unit may promote a child’s interests. The
court also expressed a measure of doubt about the necessity of establishing
the biological truth where the child is very young and the search for paternity
emanates from a third party.61
The European Court of Human Rights has also rejected the claim that the
absolute birth secrecy granted in some European countries, like France,
violates Article 8 of the ECHR.62 In 2003, the French practice was
challenged under Article 8 of the ECHR in the Odièvre decision.63 The court
held that the possibility that the anonymously born claimant might be
provided with non-identifying data, together with the provisions of the 2002
legislation authorizing an independent council to waive confidentiality with
the mother’s consent, were sufficient evidence of France’s efforts to seek a
balance and to ensure proportional weighting of competing interests.64
Dissenting judges in Odièvre regarded the right to know as having been
entirely sidestepped.65 In Jäggi v. Switzerland, decided only three years after
Odièvre, the court adopted the dissenting judges’ approach and emphasized
the importance of the balancing of all rights without giving absolute priority
to any of them.66 It would appear that the court would no longer decide
Odièvre along the same lines today, and that French law will most likely
have to be amended accordingly.67
60

Id.
BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 71. Note that Nylund seemed to forestall any further
claims by presumptive genetic fathers. Nylund, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. (located under heading
“The Law” pt. 2(a)).
62
Odièvre v. France, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 3, 49.
63
Id. In that case, Ms. Odièvre argued that the fact that her mother had been allowed to
keep Ms. Odièvre’s biological identity from her via the French practice of anonymous birth
infringed Article 8 of the ECHR. Id. paras. 10, 24–25.
64
Id. para. 49.
65
Id. para. 7 (Wildhaber, J., dissenting). According to the dissenting judges in the case, the
margin of appreciation doctrine should not be regarded as exempting the Court from its duty
to review the way in which the rights had been balanced. Id. paras. 10–12 (Wildhaber, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, the problem with the decision lay in the fact that French law, by
giving absolute priority to the right of the mother, precludes any balancing of the interests at
stake, resulting in a violation of the inner core of the child’s rights. Id. paras. 11–12
(Wildhaber, J., dissenting).
66
Jäggi v. Switzerland, 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 30 (2006).
67
See BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 399 (noting that recent “admonishments . . . have
prompted the French government to review its legislation on accouchement sous X [the right
to anonymous birth]”).
61
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A nuanced and sensitive approach is needed to balance the child’s
interests and safeguard the child’s emotional well-being. If knowledge of a
child’s origins might destabilize the child’s family life, it is questionable
which of the child’s interests takes precedence and must be protected. To
what extent will the interest of knowing one’s biological parents be
protected? No answer to this question is provided in the wording of the
ECHR or offered by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights. What is clear, however, is that neither the CRC nor the ECHR
provide a legal framework that permits the assertion of an absolute, childconstructed right to identity.68
III. COMPARATIVE LAW POSITION: CONTRASTING APPROACHES
This Part of the Article examines the law in various jurisdictions,
particularly France, Sweden, England,69 and the United States and their
varying approaches to the issue. The vastly differing legal approaches in
these countries are integrated into this Article’s arguments for and against
mandatory disclosure and anonymous sperm donation. France has been
selected for examination because in that country the doctrine of anonymity is
respected as an absolute necessity by the French medical profession in
accordance with its general duty to maintain secrecy.70 By contrast, Sweden
has been selected because it was the first nation to ban donor anonymity in
light of its growing culture of openness.71 Passage of the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information)
68

Ronen, supra note 46, at 167.
Prior to the 1980s, there was little information available about donor conception in
England and no regulation or central recording of semen donations. Turkmendag et al., supra
note 6, at 285. Until 1977 children born through donor insemination were considered
illegitimate and would-be parents had to legally adopt the child. Id. Clinicians recommended
parents tell the child that he or she was adopted rather than conceived through donor
insemination. Waldman, supra note 12, at 547. The donor was the legal father rather than the
mother’s husband, but the husband was often recorded as the father on the birth certificate,
which was technically a crime. Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 285. Prior to the
development of DNA testing to prove genetic parentage conclusively, scientific blood testing
had limited ability fully to determine paternity. Smart, supra note 30, at 398. Even the
availability of DNA tests hardly changed the situation since a mother could refuse permission
for a blood sample to be taken from her child. See, e.g., Re F (a Minor) (Blood Test: Parental
Rights) [1993] Fam. 314 (Eng.); Re CB (Unmarried Mother) (Blood Test) [1994] 2 F.L.R. 762
(Eng.).
70
See infra Part III.A.
71
S. Leeb-Lundberg et al., Helping Parents to Tell Their Children About the Use of Donor
Insemination (DI) and Determining Their Opinions About Open-Identity Sperm Donors, 85
ACTA OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 78, 78 (2006).
69
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Regulations modified English law72 by removing the right to anonymity from
gamete donors and giving adult children conceived through donor conception
the right to acquire the identity of the donor.73 Conversely, in the United
States, neither state nor federal legislation prohibits or enforces anonymous
sperm donation.74 Nonbinding professional guidelines have traditionally
recommended that gamete donors remain anonymous,75 but in 2004, the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine Ethics Committee endorsed
disclosure by parents to their children about the use of donor gametes.76
The different approaches of these selected legislatures to this issue are
briefly outlined in this Part, and then principles from these four jurisdictions
will be used to support arguments for and against the acknowledgement of an
absolute right of the child to know his origins.
A. France: Anonymity Rules
Traditional French “respect for life” arguments for the maintenance of
accouchement sous X 77 have joined with the feminist “pro-choice” argument
to form an “anti-biological” opposition to arguments for a right to origins.78
Instead, the parent–child relationship is considered a “purely social
construction.”79 In France, maternity and motherhood were historically
regarded as clearly separate, and women have possessed the right to give
birth anonymously (accouchement sous X) since the Revolution.80 Anyone
who discloses the identity of a donor registered in France is, in principle,
liable to criminal prosecution.81 However, French law does provide for the

72

Wherever English law is referred to in this Article, it includes references to Welsh law.
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information)
Regulations, 2004, S.I. 2004/1511 (U.K.) [hereinafter Regulation 2004/1511]; Press Release,
U.K. Dep’t of Health, Anonymity to Be Removed from Future Sperm, Egg and Embryo
Donors (Jan. 21, 2004).
74
Lucy Frith, Gamete Donation and Anonymity: The Ethical and Legal Debate, 16 HUM.
REPROD. 818, 819 (2001).
75
Id. (citing ETHICS COMM., AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1998)).
76
Ethics Comm., Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Informing Offspring of Their Conception by
Gamete Donation, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 527, 527 (2004).
77
Translated as the right to anonymous birth.
78
JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN & CATHERINE LABRUSSE-RIOU, PRODUIRE L’HOMME: DE QUEL
DROIT? ETUDE JURIDIQUE ET ÉTHIQUE DES PROCRÉATIONS ARTIFICIELLES (1987).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 313–14; see also CODE DE LA SANTÉ PUBLIQUE art. L12115 (Fr.). The state utilizes this legislation to promote the public goal of protecting the mother
73
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collection of non-identifying data about birth mothers asking for anonymity
and states that these birth mothers may end their anonymity at any time.82
But children still have no right to access documents revealing the biological
mother’s name, and the possibility of establishing any bond between the
mother and the child is generally prohibited.83 However, since the CRC
came into force, secret birth can be lifted on request of the child and with the
assent of the mother.84 Further non-identifying information has also been
made more easily accessible through independent sources.85
B. Sweden and England: Banning Anonymity but No Absolute Right
Both Sweden and England have banned anonymous sperm donation.86 In
1984, Sweden was the first country to remove the anonymity of sperm
donors.87 A child born in Sweden through donor insemination has the right,
but only when “sufficiently mature,” to receive information about the use of
donor insemination and the identity of the donor.88
Two decades after the introduction of this legislation, studies indicate that
Swedish parents are becoming more comfortable with disclosing the
circumstances of donor conception to their children. An early study
conducted in 2000, found that only 11% of Swedish parents had informed
their children about the nature of their conception.89 An additional 41% of
the parents intended to tell their children at a later time.90 It should be noted,
though, that the children of parents that intended to disclose information to at
a later date were young, the average age being three-and-a half years old.91
and child at the birth, preventing illegal abortions and child abandonment. BLAUWHOFF, supra
note 12, at 395.
82
BLAUWHOFF supra note 12, at 196; see generally CODE DE L’ACTION SOCIALE ET DES
FAMILLES art. L147-1 (Fr.). An important function of the Code de l’Action Sociale et des
Familles is to gather together information requested by all departments, overseas territories,
and relevant organizations and to make it easier to access information about one’s origins. Id.
83
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 311-19 (Fr.).
84
BLAUWHOFF supra note 12, at 120–21.
85
Besson, supra note 23, at 154.
86
LAG OM INSEMINATION (Svensk forfattningssamling [SFS] 1984:1140) (Swed.);
Regulation 2004/1511, supra note 73, art. 2, para. 3.
87
Frith, supra note 74.
88
4 § LAG OM INSEMINATION (SFS 1984:1140) (Swed.); see A. Lalos et al., Legislated Right
for Donor-Insemination Children to Know Their Genetic Origin: A Study of Parental
Thinking, 22 HUM. REPROD. 1759, 1759 (2007).
89
Gottlieb et al., supra note 12, at 2055.
90
Id. The mean age of the children who had been told was five-and-a-half years old, and
that of those who might be told in the future was three-and-a-half. Id. at 2053–54.
91
Id. at 2053.
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In a Swedish study for 2006, 75% of parents were found to have disclosed or
to be intending to disclose the nature of the conception.92 Most recently, a
study published in 2011 found that as many as 90% of parents who had used
donor conception supported disclosure and openness to children concerning
their genetic origin.93
The reasons furnished by parents for increased openness were the
avoidance of an accidental discovery by the child, a general desire for
openness, and recognition of the child’s fundamental right to know.94 Thus,
in Sweden, the rates of disclosure have improved significantly, which may
indicate that the removal of anonymity and counseling have facilitated
disclosure.95 Further studies are required to determine whether the parents
who intended to disclose their real identities to their donor-conceived
offspring, actually did so.
English law has increasingly become a champion for the right to know
one’s origins and the importance of the genetic family. Adoptive parents are
now encouraged to allow adopted children to know about their biological
parents and even to have contact with them if it is in their child’s best
interests. Similarly, after divorce, the courts encourage children to remain in
contact with their nonresident fathers.96 This same trend is apparent in
regard to donor-conceived children. Judicial arguments in England and
Wales now acknowledge the right of a donor-conceived child to identifying
information under Article 8 of the ECHR.97 Furthermore, beginning in April
2005 donor-conceived adults were allowed to obtain identifying information
from the Human Embryology and Fertility Authority register, which is

92

S. Isaksson et al., Two Decades After Legislation on Identifiable Donors in Sweden: Are
Recipient Couples Ready to Be Open About Using Gamete Donation?, 26 HUM. REPROD. 853,
853 (2011).
93
Id.
94
Lalos et al., supra note 88, at 1765. Parents who had not told their children feared public
attitudes and considered artificial insemination a private matter. Id. at 1766.
95
A Swedish study found that counseling may help some couples to find the right “scripts”
to inform their child about their conception, for example, by referring to the donor as a “kind
man” who was eager to assist them in overcoming their problems. Id. at 1762.
96
Carol Smart, Family Secrets: Law and Understandings of Openness in Everyday
Relationships, 38 J. SOC. POL’Y 551, 564 (2009).
97
Rose v. Secretary of State for Health, [2002] EWHC (Admin) 1593, [2002] 2 F.L.R. 962,
[47]–[48]. In this case, the court recognized the right of such a child to the knowledge of the
identity of his or her father. The judge held that there is “an obligation on the state to allow the
ties of family life to develop normally and that this obligation is not limited to compelling a state
to abstain from interference with family life; it may require the existence in domestic law of legal
safeguards that render family life possible. The same . . . applies to respect for private life which
often cannot be separately compartmentalized from family life . . . .” Id. [42].
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supplied to clinics.98 Also beginning in April 2005 clinics obtained
identifying information from all donors99 and in 2023 the first eighteen-yearold, donor-conceived adults will have the right to establish the identity of
their sperm donors.100 The inconsistency of information provided by donors
in the past is likely to continue to pose problems. Before the banning of
donor anonymity, clinics were advised to encourage donors to record as
much non-identifying information as they could,101 but earlier studies
98

Regulation 2004/1511, supra note 73, art. 2, para. 3. In England, donor-conceived
people are also currently entitled to information about half-siblings who share the same donor.
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 31ZA (U.K.) [hereinafter HFEA
1990]. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, as amended by the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22 (U.K.) [hereinafter HFEA 2008], grants them
the right to ascertain the existence, number, sex, year of birth, and, by mutual agreement, the
identity of other individuals sharing the same donor. HFEA 1990, supra, §§ 31ZA(2)(b),
31ZE. Donor-conceived children aged sixteen and above have the right to know (with the
specified person’s consent) whether or not they may be related to a specified person with
whom they intend to enter into a marriage, a civil partnership, or an intimate physical
relationship. Id. § 31ZB. Once aged eighteen, donor-conceived children have the right to
obtain identifying information about any donor-conceived genetic siblings who are also at
least eighteen and who have agreed to identifying information being released to a genetically
related sibling who is requesting such information. Id. § 31ZE(2). Donors also have the right
to access non-identifying information about children conceived through the use of their
gametes, such as number, sex, and dates of birth. Id. § 31ZD.
99
Regulation 2004/1511, supra note 73, art. 2, para. 3. In a study intended to investigate
the new phenomenon of parents of donor children contacting donor siblings, 791 participants
provided information regarding their reasons for attempting to find their child’s biological
parent and siblings, the outcome of the searches, and their experiences regarding contact with
biological family members that were found. T. Freeman et al., Gamete Donation: Parents’
Experiences of Searching for Their Child’s Donor Siblings and Donor, 24 HUM. REPROD. 505,
505 (2009). Whereas parents’ principal motivation for seeking out donors was enhancing
their child’s sense of identity, the primary reason for seeking out donor siblings was curiosity.
Id. Searches for donor siblings sometimes led to the discovery of a large number of donor
siblings. Id. Ultimately, a majority of the parents who participated in the study reported a
positive experience with the process. Id. These findings emphasize that
having access to information about a child’s donor origins is important for
some parents and has potentially positive consequences. These findings have
wider implications because the removal of donor anonymity in the UK and
elsewhere means that increasing numbers of donor offspring are likely to
seek contact with their donor relations in the future.
Id.
100
See RESPONSE TO DRAFT BILL, supra note 11, para. 66 (noting that donor-conceived
persons born after 2005 have the right to access identifying and non-identifying information).
101
Donor Recruitment, Assessment and Screening, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY
AUTHORITY, para. 11.9, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/498.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). The
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has collected personal information about the
donor such as the donor’s name at the time of donation, name at time of birth, place of birth
and whether or not the donor has children and some physical characteristics since 1991.
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suggested that the information provided on the forms was sparse and most
donors preferred not to complete any of the optional parts.102
Despite new legislation promoting disclosure to donor-conceived
children, both English and Swedish law continue to allow an infertile couple
who has used donor conception to pass the child off as entirely their own
biological child.103 One research study indicated that as many as 46% of
donor-conceived children in England grow up assuming that their legal
parents are also their biological parents.104
C. United States: No Federal Legislative Regulation
The minimal presence of state and federal regulation of the sperm donor
industry in the United States has resulted in a patchwork of nonbinding
professional guidelines and use of individual clinical discretion.105 “Almost

However, providing that information did not become compulsory until 2005. HFEA 1990,
supra note 98.
102
See Making Your Decision, DONOR CONCEPTION NETWORK, http://www.dcnetwork.org/m
aking-your-decision (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (noting the lack of donor information
available to clinics in multiple nations).
103
See Lalos et al., supra note 88 (noting the failure of the law to determine who, if anyone,
has the duty to inform children of their donor-conceived status); S. Golombok et al., NonGenetic and Non-Gestational Parenthood: Consequences for Parent–Child Relationships and
the Psychological Well-Being of Mothers, Fathers and Children at Age 3, 21 HUM. REPROD.
1918, 1921 (2006).
104
See Golombok et al., supra note 103, at 1921 (noting that 46% of parents had no
intention of ever informing their children regarding donor-conceived status).
105
Frith, supra note 74. Some states have enacted legislation proclaiming that the donor,
child, or both acknowledge the absence of rights or duties with regard to the other. See, e.g.,
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.239 (West 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-257(D) (2011). Some
states establish that the sperm donor has no rights as father and, if the woman is married, that
her husband is the legal father. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (1987); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 40/2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 97-1136 of 2012 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Law § 73 (McKinney 2008). Nine States have enacted the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000,
which allows agencies that maintain birth records to release such information to donors, state
and federal agencies, and courts only. Uniform Parentage Act (2000); see, e.g., Alabama
Uniform Parentage Act, ALA. CODE § 26-17-101 (2008). Twelve states have adopted the 1973
Uniform Parentage Act which calls for donor information to be confidential, but subject to
inspection by the court upon a showing of good cause. Uniform Parentage Act (1973); see,
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600–7730 (West 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-4-101 to -130
(1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1975); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1-45/28
(1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110 to -1138 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.55–.75 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); MO. REV. STAT.
§§ 210.817–854 (2000). In Johnson v. Superior Court, the court acknowledged that
California possessed a compelling interest in protecting the health and welfare of children
conceived by artificial insemination and that at times it became necessary for those using
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all fertility clinics in the United States now offer detailed, non-identifying
information about the potential donor’s characteristics and medical
history,”106 and an increasing number of clinics offer recipients the choice of
gametes from donors who agree to be identified. In most of these
arrangements, the donor contractually permits the clinic to release
identifying information to resulting children in the future, if the child asks for
it.107 Clinics, such as the California Sperm Bank, may offer both the donor
and the couple a choice of anonymous or open donors and match them
accordingly.108
Though most sperm banks tend to comply with professional guidelines,
inconsistencies still exist nationally.109 A large number of fertility clinics
discard the relevant documentation as soon as an insemination procedure is
finished.110 This practice is acceptable because the guidelines are voluntary,
not binding.111
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NONDISCLOSURE
A policy of nondisclosure may be perceived as a way of ensuring that,
firstly, the nongenetic parent feels connected to the child; secondly, the child
develops a strong bond with the one genetic parent; thirdly, the appearance
of a “normal” family is maintained; fourthly, there is as little disruption of
the child’s stability as possible; and finally, the genetic parent’s infertility (a
condition that may still carry a negative stigma in some societies) is able to
remain undisclosed. This “nondisclosure model” favors the interests of the

artificial insemination to obtain biological and genetic information about their child’s donor.
95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). In such cases, the court held that parents of
donor-conceived children must have some avenue to uncover the otherwise confidential
documentation regarding artificial insemination and ordered the disclosure of information that
was necessary and relevant to the litigation to the person who sought the information. Id. at
879.
106
See Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case for Non-Anonymous Gamete
Donation, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 11–12 (2008).
107
Id. at 12.
108
Barbara Raboy, Secrecy and Openness in Donor Insemination: A New Paradigm, 12
POL. & LIFE SCI. 191, 191 (1993) (noting that 80% of the clinic’s recipients chose to use open
donors).
109
Pino D’Orazio, Note, Half of the Family Tree: A Call for Access to a Full Genetic
History for Children Born by Artificial Insemination, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 249, 258
n.35 (2006).
110
Id. at 262.
111
Id. at 258.
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would-be parents, the child’s need for stability and normality, and the
privacy rights of the sperm donor.
A. Focusing on the Would-Be Parents
1. Deliberate Deception or Legitimate Failure to Disclose?
Parents’ failure to inform a donor-conceived child of the method of his
conception could be perceived as deliberately deceptive behavior, especially
if children have a fundamental right to know about their genetic origins and
to information about essential aspects of their personal history.112 However,
some parents may consider secrecy necessary if their society would ostracize
them because of the fertility problem or disapprove of the method of
conception of their children.113 A New Zealand study of attitudes of wouldbe parents indicated that, in the 1970s, donors were not considered persons
with rights to inclusion in their construction of their family; these couples
felt the connection of genes to parentage was artificially constructed by
society.114 For many of them, the act of sperm donation was perceived as
nothing more than an altruistic gift or a marketable service such as a blood or
organ donation.115
2. Parents’ Reasons for Nondisclosure
A study of would-be parents’ perceptions regarding the role of donors
reflected a number of tensions: a gratitude toward the donor, the desire never
to meet the donor, the fear that the child might think of the donor as the
“real” father, the belief that the donor is a kind person, and a constant
reminder to the male partner of his infertility and the possible shame
associated with it.116 Parents’ reasons for not informing their children
112
Andrew Bainham, Arguments About Parentage, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 322, 335–36 (2008)
(arguing that the law should oblige parents to inform their children that they are donorconceived). Bainham raised this argument before the Joint Committee on the Human Tissue
and Embryos (Draft) Bill in 2007. Id. at 334; JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, para.
270. The government has undertaken to keep this issue under review. RESPONSE TO DRAFT
BILL, supra note 11, para. 70.
113
Robyn Rowland, The Social and Psychological Consequences of Secrecy in Artificial
Insemination by Donor (AID) Programmes, 21 SOC. SCI. & MED. 391, 393 (1985).
114
Victoria M. Grace et al., The Donor, the Father, and the Imaginary Constitution of the
Family: Parents’ Constructions in the Case of Donor Insemination, 66 SOC. SCI. & MED. 301,
302 (2008).
115
Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 291.
116
Grace et al., supra note 114, at 304.
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differed widely; some intended parents indicate that their views were
ambivalent, dominated by a focus both on their own role as parents and their
desire to act in their children’s best interests.117 Other studies found that the
main reason why mothers were against disclosure or unsure about telling the
truth was because they wished to protect their children and were concerned
that other family members might perceive the child in a different light if the
child’s real genetic parentage was extensively known.118 Truth may at times
damage complex kinship relationships, and parents are often afraid of the
consequences of such knowledge in the interests of the family.119 Carol
Smart’s empirical research explores the complex area of family secrets,
querying the idea that there is a simple “physical” truth.120 Smart examines
the reasons why genetic parentage has become so significant, indicating that
there are certain secrets that have always existed in family life.121 Kinship
depends upon lived and meaningful relationships.122 In the world of natural
conception, as well as donor-conceived birth, the reality of family life may
be harsh and complex. For example, indicating to a husband that a child was
conceived from a short-lived liaison could result in a dire economic position
for mother and child; though the child may live in the knowledge of her
paternity, she and her mother may be economically destitute.123 The interests
of truth may have to be sacrificed, at times, for family stability and security
in the interests of the child. Legal truth (founded exclusively on genetic
testing) can cut through and disrupt these relationships.124
3. Discrimination Against “Social” Parents
The potential impact of the disclosure policy on would-be parents should
not be overlooked.125 Parents may be of the view that nondisclosure is the
wisest way to protect the child, themselves, and the wider family.126 As a
117

Id.
Smart, supra note 30, at 400.
119
Id.
120
Smart, supra note 96, at 553 (pointing out that there may be other truths, which may be
just as or more significant in family life and particularly for a child).
121
Id. at 558–61.
122
Id. at 555.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 564–65. For example, the wish not to reveal paternity of a child may arise from a
mother’s need to protect a child rather than simply to preserve her own reputation. Lyn
Turney, Paternity Secrets: Why Women Don’t Tell, 11 J. FAM. STUD. 227, 243 (2005).
125
During the anonymity debate leading up to the English legislation banning donor
anonymity, these interests were largely ignored. Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 292.
126
Id. at 304.
118
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result, they tell their child that they were assisted in the conception process
rather than disclosing the child’s genetic parents.127
For many parents, gestating, breast feeding, rearing, or nurturing a baby is
of far greater importance than a purely genetic relationship. If the law were
to impose a legal obligation on such parents to inform their children of the
nature of their conception—or ensure that the child is informed by means of
birth certificate or a letter delivered when the child reaches a certain age—
would this not constitute an unjustifiable invasion of the privacy rights of
would-be parents, especially since fertile parents have been deceiving
natural-born children about their conception for generations? Would it not
be discriminatory to such social parents, especially when compared with
biological parents? This might discourage such couples from conceiving
with the use of donor sperm and lead to a diminution of the number of
couples having children via this method, thus depriving them of a family.
Rather, tolerance, openness, and gradual acceptance of this method of
conception over time are the only ways in which to create the notion of such
an obligation to disclose.
B. Focusing on the Sperm Donor
1. Protection of the Sperm Donor
Gamete donors may be motivated to donate in order to help sterile
couples, but wish to avoid a parental relationship with the resulting offspring.
As a result, many will have a fundamental interest in their own privacy.128
Sperm donors may view anonymity as reassurance that their genetic
parentage cannot be established and protection from disruptive effects on
their own marriage or family life—interruptions which could not be foreseen
or desired by a child eager to know his or her genetic origins.129
Increased access to information through the Internet has had a profound
effect on donors’ ability to maintain anonymity. The Internet has enabled
donor-conceived persons to acquire much more information regarding their
donor parent once they discover the nature of their conception.130 As a
127

Id.
Julie L. Sauer, Competing Interests and Gamete Donation: The Case for Anonymity, 39
SETON HALL L. REV. 919, 943 (2009).
129
K.R. Daniels et al., The Views of Sperm Semen Donors Regarding the Swedish
Insemination Act 1984, 3 MED. L. INT’L 117, 124 (1998).
130
Andrea Mechanick Braverman, How the Internet Is Reshaping Assisted Reproduction:
From Donor Offspring Registries to Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI.
& TECH. 477, 486–87, 495 (2010).
128
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result, the sperm donor is no longer an impassive component of the process.
Instead, sperm donors are now perceived as possibly having a long-term role
in the life of the donor-conceived child.131 However, there are dangers
associated with unlimited Internet access to unverified donor information.
The information may be inaccurate, insufficient, biased, out-of-date, or just
not what the donor-conceived person wishes to know.132 Because of the
increased use of the Internet to find donors, perhaps a well-regulated system
where information provided is accurate and easily available may provide the
best means of meeting the needs of all stakeholders.133
2. Detrimental Effects of Removal of Donor Anonymity
In England, the main consequence of legislation removing donor
anonymity has been an acute shortage of sperm donors.134 Because of
donors’ reluctance to donate, English clinics cannot meet the demand for
gametes.135 Clinics maintain long waiting lists of patients who wish to get
treatment, and patients are increasingly participating in reproductive tourism
to countries where anonymity is still permitted to avoid the negative impact
of the law.136 As recruited gamete donors become less willing to make
donations, there is pressure to accept donors with suboptimal characteristics;
for example, in England the age profile of the average donor has increased.137
131

Id.
Id. at 493.
133
Id. at 496.
134
Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 284.
135
Jane Dreaper, IVF Donor Sperm Shortage Revealed, BBC News (Sept. 13, 2006), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/5341982.stm.
136
Two of Scotland’s four NHS clinics suspended services because of a lack of donors.
Figures from Scotland’s IVF Clinics, BBC News (June 10, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/scotland/5065050.stm. In one clinic, the waiting time for egg donation treatment
more than doubled after donor anonymity was removed, from two years to at least five years.
Id. Another clinic had no new donations since the law was introduced and there were between
thirty and forty patients that the clinic was unable to treat. Id. One clinic reported that for the
first time they had to start a waiting list for treatment using donor sperm at the end of last year
and they were no longer able to offer any treatment until supplies became available. Id. In
the Netherlands, the total number of sperm donors decreased from 900 to 300, sperm banks
have decreased by half, and the waiting time for treatment surpassed two years in a ten-year
span. William Weber, Dutch Sperm Donors Will Remain Anonymous For Another Two Years,
355 LANCET 1249, 1249 (2000).
137
Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 284, 288. In September 2005, the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority reported that donors in 2004 and 2005 were typically
family men aged between thirty-six and forty years.
HUMAN FERTILISATION AND
EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, WHO ARE THE DONORS? AN HFEA ANALYSIS OF DONOR
REGISTRATIONS AND USE OF DONOR GAMETES OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS, at 5 (2005) available
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It has also led to the development of an underground semen market on the
Internet, which often utilizes unscreened semen.138
The desire to sustain a continuous supply of donors is a frequent
argument in support of the existing legal position in the United States and
France.139 Opponents of mandated disclosure have argued that the fertility
industry in the United States would disappear with a move toward mandatory
disclosure of donor information.140 In Britain, anticipation of the new donor
legislation in 2005 contributed to the drop in the number of donors.141
However, it seems that there are more donations from older, more
magnanimously motivated donors. As a result, if similar legislation were
adopted in the United States, it is arguable that the amount of sperm
donations may plateau at an acceptable rate after a few years, as happened in
Sweden and appears to be happening in England.142

at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Who_are_the_donors_factsheet.pdf.
This represents a
substantial change from 1994 and 1995 when the most common age group for sperm donors
was eighteen and twenty-four years. Id.
138
Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 284.
139
Id.
140
D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 272.
141
E.g., Waldman, supra note 12, at 555 (citing British Sperm Banks Near Empty, NEWS24
(Sept. 25, 2006), http://www.news24.com/World/News/British-sperm-banks-near-empty-20060
925). In 1998 and 1999 when confidentiality was assured under English law, there were more
than 10,000 donor insemination treatments performed; by 2003 when public debate over donor
children’s information rights was in full swing, that number had fallen to little more than 6,000.
The Newcastle Fertility Centre reported a drop from 175 donor applicants in 1994 to only 25
applicants in 2003. Donor’s Crisis Over Anonymity, DAILY MAIL, Nov. 10, 2005, at 36. It was
reported that the number of donors diminished to less than 100 in the first six months of 2005
after the legislation. Ed Boyle, Supply and Demand, CBS NEWS (Aug. 3, 2006), http://www.cbs
news.com/video/watch/?id=1864669n. However, representatives for the HFEA disputed these
figures and pointed out that supply still continues to outstrip demand in some areas of the U.K.
Sperm Donor Law ‘Not a Deterrent,’ BBC NEWS (June 8, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk
_news/england/5054910.stm. Similar problems were experienced in New Zealand when
anonymous donation was prohibited. Waldman, supra note 12, at 554 (citing Emily Watt,
Wanted: Keen Kiwi Lads to Help Populate Australia, SUNDAY STAR TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006,
at 1). A normally healthy roster of donors dwindled in the two years following the legislation
to a sole donor. Id.
142
Waldman, supra note 12, at 552–53, 555; see also Paula Beauchamp, Canadians Answer
Sperm Call, AUSTRALIAN (July 9, 2004), http://www.canadiancrc.com/newspaper_articles/Th
e_Australian_Canadian_sperm_donors_09JUL04.aspx (reporting that the state of Victoria
managed to keep the sperm center operational by focusing on older more altruistic donors, but
in New South Wales, there was such a shortage of donors that one clinic apparently flew
Canadian students to Australia for complementary vacations, in return for three or four sperm
donations a week).
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C. Focusing on the Child
1. The Child’s Right to Life and Autonomy
The arguments in favor of mandatory disclosure generally assume that
disclosure is in the best interest of all donor offspring, but there is no clear
evidence that knowledge of identifying information is required or even
beneficial for the well-being of donor offspring.143 In fact, psychological
research supports the viewpoint that a genetic relationship is not essential for
good social parenting or satisfactory emotional development of children.144
What of a child who states that he or she does not wish to know? Should
such a child be obliged to know for his or her own long-term good? Finally,
at what stage should the child be told? Who decides what age is best to tell a
child that he or she was conceived through donation? The value of a right to
openness for a child is questionable when a child is never conceived because
gamete donors are reluctant to accept a long-term commitment from which
they may only expect to derive costs.
Disclosure about the process of donor conception requires the child to
differentiate between the “social” and the “biological” aspects of parenthood.
Obviously, historically this schism was not present, and legislators or
drafters of rights on parentage are generally not ready to take on the
unfamiliar topic. They fail to recognize that a sense of identity is generally
the result of the child’s experience rather than an adult imposition.145 An
overemphasis on genes does not give full recognition to the bonds created by
nurture and love by the child’s actual caretakers.146 It may also lead to a
desire to establish a relationship with donors at the expense of valuable
bonds with the child’s extended family.147 There is also the danger that a
donor-conceived child might wish to establish a relationship with the donor
and then be rejected.148

143

Daniels et al., supra note 129, at 155.
Susan Golombok et al., Families Created by the New Reproductive Technologies:
Quality of Parenting and Social and Emotional Development of the Children, 66 CHILD DEV.
285, 295–97 (1995).
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Smart, supra note 96, at 555.
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Id.; see generally Re J (Paternity: Welfare of Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) 2837, [2007]
2 F.L.R. 26 (recognizing that the impact on the mother and father of revealing donor
conception to a child outweighed the advantage of the child of learning the truth).
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Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 298–99.
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Sauer, supra note 128, at 941.
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2. The Analogy of Adoption
The literature on adoption over the past thirty years has emphasized the
right of children to know their biological origins because of the importance
of that knowledge to a child’s identity formation.149 Those who draw
analogies between adoption and donor conception favor openness and
believe that children have a right to and a medical need for information about
their origins.150
However, an adopted child’s relationship with her social or legal parents
is distinct from a donor-conceived child’s relationship with her birth parents.
In adoption proceedings, the state is involved because adoption is, at least in
Western countries, a state-created and state-controlled procedure.151 Thus
the state has an interest in regulating identifying information in adoption
cases.152 Alternatively, the medical profession rather than the state is
generally engaged in the procedure of anonymous artificial insemination.
Adoption and donor-assisted conception are also different in that adoption
involves the creation of a family around an already existing individual, but
donor conception is a form of procreation where one parent is biologically
related to the child and the child’s conception is greatly desired.153
These differences contribute to the difficulty of analogizing the two
situations and calls into question some countries insistence on the
comparability between adopted and donor-conceived children.154 In this
instance, a rights-based approach should not trump one based on the
evidence of researchers into the welfare of such children and would-be
parents.155 Although research on adopted children indicates that such
children need information about their birth as early as possible, no
convincing research has found a corresponding benefit in disclosing donor
149
Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 289. Baroness Warnock, Chair of the 1984 Warnock
Committee of Inquiry into Fertilisation and Embryology, stated that she supported the view
that donor-conceived people should have the same “right to know” as adopted people.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO
HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, 1984, Cm. 9314, at 24–25 (U.K.) [hereinafter
DHSS REPORT].
150
Glenn McGee et al., Gamete Donation and Anonymity: Disclosure to Children
Conceived with Donor Gametes Should Not Be Optional, 16 HUM. REPROD. 2033, 2034–35
(2001).
151
Sauer, supra note 128, at 942.
152
Id.
153
Erica Haimes, ‘Secrecy’: What Can Artificial Reproduction Learn From Adoption?, 2
INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 46, 47 (1988).
154
Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 289–91.
155
Id. at 305.
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information to donor-conceived children. In fact, research indicates that
children who have not been told are well-adjusted and generally stable.156
3. Child’s Welfare and Knowledge of Genetic Origins
Although findings from research and clinical experience tend to support a
child’s need for openness about factual circumstances,157 a far more complex
picture emerges when it comes to access to donor identity. Knowledge of
the identity of birth parents can contribute to the child’s inner development
but does not seem to be essential.158 There does not appear to be clear data
that nondisclosure to donor-conceived children has been exacting a
psychological cost on such children.159
Though some studies have indicated that there a negative effect results
from failure to disclose donor information, the methodology used in at least
some of those studies raised concerns. For example, one study performed by
psychologists in the United States examined how donor-conceived children
felt about the secrecy surrounding their conception, their problems in
obtaining information, and efforts to make contact with the genetic parent.160
156

Id. at 290; FORTIN, supra note 1, at 473.
See generally Sarah Maclean & Mavis Maclean, Keeping Secrets in Assisted
Reproduction – The Tension Between Donor Anonymity and the Need of the Child for
Information, 8 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 243 (1996) (arguing that governments should facilitate
openness when questions arise about a child’s biological origin).
158
Waldman, supra note 12, at 525–26. It has been argued that lack of knowledge of one’s
origins can be harmful to children. H.J. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with
Substitute Parents, 37 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 133, 133 (1964). Sants considered the
psychodynamics of genealogical bewilderment in relation to the self-image and the Oedipus
complex. Id. He related the bewilderment of the adopted child to the child’s relationship with
the mother and the triangular relationship with his or her father and mother, and concluded
that no child can be severed completely from his roots in the natural family, and that no child
should be kept from knowing his or her natural origins. Id. at 140. Although the argument
was first raised in connection with adopted children, this idea has been transferred to donorconceived children. Frith, supra note 74, at 82 (citing ALEXINA MCWHINNIE, FAMILIES
FOLLOWING ASSISTED CONCEPTION: WHAT DO WE TELL OUR CHILD? (1996)). However, since
Sants’s initial research, it has been argued that adoptees in a secure home may be eager to
know about their ancestors, but are not necessarily harmed mentally by not knowing. Michael
Humphrey & Heather Humphrey, A Fresh Look at Genealogical Bewilderment, 59 BRIT. J.
MED. PSYCHOL. 133, 133 (1986).
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Waldman, supra note 12, at 535–45.
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See generally A.J. Turner & A. Coyle, What Does It Mean to be a Donor Offspring? The
Identity Experience of Adults Conceived by Donor Insemination and the Implications for
Counselling and Therapy, 15 HUM. REPROD. 2041, 2042 (2000). In this study, participants
were recruited from donor conception support networks in the Australia, Canada, United
Kingdom, and United States. Id. at 2043. The participants were required to complete a
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That study concluded that such children felt alienated from their families,
suggesting that anonymous donation had a very negative effect on the donor
offspring, and there was a need to move toward increased openness in this
area of the law.161 However, that study may have been misleading as only
sixteen people completed the study, and those people were not a truly
random sample because only disenchanted donor-conceived children were
contacted to participate.162
More useful are the controlled studies performed in Europe.163 Overall,
family relationships within the families of donor-conceived children were
found to be stronger than those within families of naturally conceived
children, and the mental health and development of the donor-conceived
children was found to be no different from that of their peers in natural
families.164 Such children were reassessed in adolescence.165 In this group,

questionnaire, which reported feelings of rejection by and distance from their would-be
fathers. Id. at 2043–44. The participants reported that the discovery of their donor offspring
status was horrifying to them and a blow to their sense of self; they felt a powerful desire to
know more about their biological donors and a feeling of loss that they did not know their
genetic father. Id. at 2044–46.
161
Id. at 2050.
162
Id. at 2043.
163
E.g., S. Golombok et al., The European Study of Assisted Reproduction Families: Family
Functioning and Child Development, 11 HUM. REPROD. 2324, 2324 (1996). This study
included children conceived using donor eggs or sperm, and adoptive children. Id. at 2325.
One hundred eleven of the families involved in the study had a donor-conceived child. Id.
The study found that parents of children conceived via donor insemination obtained higher
ratings for parental warmth and emotional involvement than parents of children conceived
naturally. Id. at 2330. Furthermore, the study found that the quality of the relationship
between donor insemination fathers and their children was not affected by the lack of a
genetic tie. Id. The donor-conceived children had high self-esteem and strong emotional
attachment toward their social parents. Id. There was no evidence of increased occurrences
of psychological disorders and the children’s perceptions of their relationship with their
parents were similar to those of naturally conceived and adopted children. Id. But cf.
ELIZABETH MARQUARDT ET AL., COMM’N ON PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE, MY DADDY’S NAME IS
DONOR: A NEW STUDY OF YOUNG ADULTS CONCEIVED THROUGH SPERM DONATION (2010),
available at http://www.familyscholars.org/assets/Donor_FINAL.pdf. The study found that
young adults conceived through sperm donation are “hurting more, are more confused, [and]
feel more isolated from their families.” Id. at 5. It is significant, however, that this study
researched children raised by heterosexual married couples, single mothers, and lesbian
couples. Id. at 44. Research focusing solely on donor-conceived children born to
heterosexual couples finds them to be generally well-adjusted. Golombok et al., supra note
13, at 965.
164
Waldman, supra note 12, at 539.
165
S. Golombok et al., The European Study of Assisted Reproduction Families: The
Transition to Adolescence, 17 HUM. REPROD. 830, 830 (2002); see also Waldman, supra note
12, at 539–41.
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nearly 70% of parents had decided not to inform their children about their
origins.166 Research compared the socio-emotional function and the quality
of the parental relationship with donor-conceived children who were told and
those who were not told of their donor status.167 Children in both groups
were doing equally well in terms of school performance, confidence, and
peer relationships; groups who told their children about the use of a donor
reported fewer child–mother disputes than those who did not disclose.168
Donor-conceived children who were not told, although not as well-off as
those who had been told, were still doing well emotionally and socially and
did not appear to be much damaged by the nature of their origins in terms of
their relationship with their mothers.169 It should be noted, however, that this
set of results also appears unreliable, as only six sets of families had
informed their children.170 Another study examining whether disclosure of
the identity of the donor affected parental bonding found that among 184
families, there was no evidence that nondisclosure was harmful for family
relationship or a symptom of family problems.171 What this research
indicates is that donor-conceived children who are unaware of their donor
status are flourishing within their families, and there is little reason to be
concerned for their welfare. In light of these results, legislatures need to
assess carefully the risk of compulsory disclosure on such families.
V. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISCLOSURE
The next Part of this Article aims to assess fully the nature of the child’s
right to know his or her biological origins and the advantages of openness
and disclosure to such a child.
166

Golombok et al., supra note 165, at 836.
Id. at 837.
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Id.; see also Emma Lycett et al., Offspring Created as a Result of Donor Insemination: A
Study of Family Relationships, Child Adjustment, and Disclosure, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY
172 (2004). In this study conducted in the United Kingdom, eighteen of forty-six families
were inclined toward disclosure. Id. at 173. The study found that non-disclosing mothers
reported more conflict with their children and perceived themselves as less competent parents
than disclosing mothers. Id. at 175–76. But this was not evidence of dysfunctionality in the
family, which was generally well-adjusted. Id. at 179. In nondisclosure families the
relationship between children and parents was found to be still within a functional and normal
range. Id.
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Lycett et al., supra note 169, at 178.
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Robert D. Nachtigall et al., Stigma, Disclosure, and Family Functioning Among Parents
of Children Conceived Through Donor Insemination, 68 FERTILITY & STERILITY 83, 89
(1997).
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A. The Importance of Genes
Scientific strides made toward decoding the human genome have
increased the accessibility of full-scale genetic tests.172 Donated gametes,
particularly in the United States, are usually screened for a great variety of
hereditary diseases and characteristics.173 Accurate medical history is often
important in preventative and diagnostic treatment of illnesses. Specific
information brings a degree of certainty about future ill health or even the
mode and manner of one’s own death, and access to donor information may
provide the donor child with a complete genetic and medical history to make
health decisions.174 It has been argued that proponents of donor anonymity
overlook the fact that genetic information was needed in some cases and in
doing so ignore the individual, personal, and psychological concerns of the
child involved.175 It is also argued that the lack of mandatory testing,
screening of donors, general regulation, and control of this process at the
federal level in the United States has resulted in an assisted reproduction
industry that is incapable of tackling the issues of donor anonymity and
access to genetic information through self-regulation.176
Although some states have enacted legislation permitting donorconceived children to obtain gamete donor information through court order
when they make a satisfactory showing of “good cause” or a similar
standard,177 it is foreseeable that the strides that continue to be made in
genetic science demand a system where an individual does not have to wait
for an illness to gain access to his proper genetic history.178 According to
this view, states should address the rights of the growing population of donor
offspring by implementing provisions to guarantee the documentation,
preservation, and disclosure of donor information and establishing some
172

Dennison, supra note 106, at 14.
Id. A number of countries, including those that still allow anonymous donation, have
maintained national registries of donors that serve as a mechanism for tracking a donor should
the child inherit a disease. For example, the United Kingdom has maintained a national
registry since 1991 although donor anonymity was only removed in 2005. See HFEA 1990,
supra note 98 (codifying the United Kingdom’s national registry).
174
D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 254–55.
175
Id. at 264.
176
Id. at 256–57.
177
ALA. CODE § 26-17-21(a) (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19-4-106(1) (West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. 210.824.01 (West 2007); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-6-106(1) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.061.1 (West 2007). In these states,
the courts must assess the interests of the parties to determine what meets the “good cause”
standard and what information should be disclosed.
178
D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 252–55.
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means of informing such children that they were conceived by sperm
donation, even though their parents may not intend to do so.179 Further
research might also support the concept that the benefits of mapping the
human genome depend not only on people’s individual genotypes and raw
genetic data, but also on the characteristics that genes produce.180 For
example, it may be necessary to know not only that a person has a certain
gene makeup, but that his or her father also had this genetic makeup, and
developed bowel cancer at fifty.181 This line of argument maintains that,
unless donor anonymity is lifted, it may be impossible for descendants to
acquire this beneficial knowledge.182
B. Lack of Regulation Leads to Dangerous “Free for All”?
Most banks comply, on the whole, with professional guidelines, but
compliance on a national level remains inconsistent.183 Because no federal
legislation governing sperm banks exists in the United States, clinics are
allowed to self-regulate screening standards, the number of donations a
donor may make, the age limits on recipients, and the price of the
procedure.184 There is no legislation to impose age or health qualifications
on recipients, regulate advertisement, limit the price for donations, or
constrain the grounds on which recipients can choose donors.185 Private and
government studies that have analyzed the artificial insemination industry
have revealed problems in genetic screening and medical record keeping.186
179

Id.
See BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 22 (discussing hereditary risks and their effect on the
right of children to know about donor insemination).
181
In the United States, federal regulation of assisted reproduction has been at best inactive.
D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 261. There has not been a statutory focus on the donor’s health
and a donor offspring’s rights to obtain information about the donor’s health status. Id.
About eighteen states provide donor offspring with the right to access donor information
through a showing of good cause. Id. The Uniform Parentage Act, a uniform law
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCUSL), encourages state codification of the good cause standard. Uniform Parentage Act
§ 5(a) (1973).
182
D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 249.
183
Id. at 257 n.35 (citing Karen M. Ginsberg, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial
Insemination Industry in the United States, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 823 (1997)).
184
Id.
185
Id. at 260.
186
Id. at 257. This is concerning as 80% of the world’s largest sperm banks are based in the
United States and rely on voluntary guidelines. Lisa Hird Chung, Note, Free Trade in Human
Reproductive Cells: A Solution to Procreative Tourism and the Unregulated Internet, 15
MINN. J. INT’L L. 263, 267 (2006). The federal government “has passed regulations requiring
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Perhaps because of these issues, the majority of medical professionals are in
favor of establishing national standards for donor screening and testing for
genetic defects in donor samples.187
A major drawback of the lack of regulation in the United States is that it
is impossible to know how many children result from any particular person’s
sperm donation.188 Sperm samples from more attractive donors may be
utilized to inseminate more women and result in more children from that
particular donor.189 Even in some countries which limit the number of
children born using a particular donor, as many as twenty-five children might
be related to a donor.190 In the United States, that number could be even
higher, increasing the risk of half-siblings unknowingly committing incest
and spreading undetected genetic disorders.191 Beyond voluntary services
such as the Donor Sibling Registry, it is impossible for donor-conceived
children in the United States to know how many other children share the
same biological donor.
Although donors are encouraged by the American Fertility Society’s to
provide detailed medical information for at least two generations of family
members, undergo a blood analysis and a physical examination for sexually
transmitted diseases, and provide a sperm sample, compliance with the
guidelines is voluntary.192 Current regulation of the fertility industry in the
screening of cell and tissue donors for ‘risk factors for, and clinical evidence of, relevant
communicable disease.’ ” Id. at 277.
187
D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 257 n.35, 278 (citing Ginsberg, supra note 183). The Food
and Drug Administration has adopted regulations requiring screening of donors for relevant
communicable disease. Id. at 256 n.33. As a result, clinics in North America generally screen
for sexually transmitted disorders, such as HIV, and genetic disorders. Id. at 258.
188
Id. at 265.
189
Id. Sperm banks in the United States are not required to limit the sales of their most
popular donor sperm. By contrast, other countries restrict the number of children one sperm
donor can produce: Denmark limits the number of live births per donor to twenty-five,
England limits the number to ten, and France limits the number to five. Chung, supra note
186, at 275–76.
190
Chung, supra note 186, at 275–76.
191
Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 5, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html?pagewanted=all.
192
Ginsberg, supra note 183, at 835 (1997).
The American Fertility Society recommends genetic screening for high-risk
donors and recommends access to a donor’s non-identifying genetic
information upon the request of the donor child. Additionally, the Ethics
Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine has advised
sperm clinics to take steps in anticipation that donor children will seek
information about their donors in the future.
D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 258. Further, the American Association of Tissue Banks
recommends screening donors for certain medical conditions that “present contraindications
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United States is largely self-imposed and “limited to ensuring that donated
gametes are free from communicable diseases and easily detectible genetic
disorders.”193 In Johnson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, however,
the court held that the state had a compelling interest in an action against an
artificial insemination clinic in requiring a party to comply with the
discovery request to disclose the sperm donor’s identity.194 That court
potentially opened the door to a less anonymous future for sperm donors.195
It would appear that some regulation of the industry is required in the United
States, and some monitoring of clinics to ensure uniform standards with
penalties for noncompliance on certain issues such as the number of children
which a donor may father.
C. Focusing on the Child
1. “Genealogical Bewilderment” and the Movement from Welfare to
Rights
Public debate on the issue of “genealogical bewilderment” began during
the 1980s.196 The concept was first developed in relation to the rights of
adopted children and maintains that “a genealogically bewildered child could
be found in any family where one of the ‘natural’ parents was unknown [to

for donation.” Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The “Orwellian Nightmare” Reconsidered: A
Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L.
REV. 625, 673 (1991).
193
D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 260 n.41 (“Statutes tend to avoid issues concerning the
donor offspring’s future potential harm in not knowing his biological background or medical
history. Only Idaho and Oregon require donors to satisfy certain medical standards.”).
194
95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). In Johnson, a donor disclosed his family
medical history to the sperm bank, including the possibility that Autosomal Dominant
Polycystic Kidney Disease was present in his family. Id. at 868. The Johnsons signed a
confidentiality agreement that provided for the donor to remain anonymous and reserved the
right of the sperm bank to destroy all information pertaining to the donor’s identity. Id. at
867. Despite assurances from the bank that the sperm was healthy, the child was diagnosed
six years later with Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease. Id. at 868. The court
concluded that it would not protect the anonymity of the donor if it found that the donor
offspring’s interests were more compelling than the donor’s interest in maintaining his or her
anonymity. Id. at 878.
195
Jessica Reaves, So Much For That No-Strings-Attached Stop at the Sperm Bank, TIME
(Aug. 24, 2000), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,53347,00.html.
196
Deborah Dempsey, Donor, Father or Parent? Conceiving Paternity in the Australian
Family Court, 18 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 76, 81 (2004). The term “genealogical
bewilderment” was first used by Sants. Sants, supra note 158.
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the child concerned].”197 The argument against anonymity for sperm donors
is similarly based on the premise that a child’s sense of identity is
inextricably linked to understanding their biological origins.198 Opponents of
anonymity, and sometimes of donor insemination generally, rely on the
argument that biologically correct information about one’s genetic parents is
necessary for a person to develop self-esteem and a positive sense of
identity.199
Where children do not suspect any differences in the circumstances of
their conception, the children do not usually question their genetic origins.
Openness and truthfulness in family relationships and respect for the child’s
autonomy are ethical demands that are almost impossible to convert into a
legal obligation. However, in 1969, the English court acquired the power to
direct paternity testing on a child if the court considered the testing to be in
the child’s best interest, irrespective of the mother or other caregiver’s
refusal to consent.200 People began to argue that, in the past, the medical
underpinning of assisted procreation had led to the prioritization of the
interests of prospective parents at the expense of their children, and that
secrecy regarding donors arose from a concern to protect male pride in
concealing male infertility.201 English judges and some academics began to
view the revelation of genetic truths as benefiting the welfare of the child,202
and, increasingly, knowing the truth came to be perceived “as (almost)
unequivocally good for children.”203 Over time, this welfare standard was
attached to a rights-based claim—that children had a right to know their
197

Dempsey, supra note 196.
Id. at 81–82 (noting that the premise that a child’s sense of identity is linked to
understanding its biological origins “informs infertility treatment policy [in the Australian
state of] Victoria . . . [where donors] must agree to enter their name and contact details in a
register, in order that any offspring so desiring can have access to this information in the
future”); see Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) pt 7 (detailing the requirements of record
keeping in cases of donor conception).
199
BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 403–04.
200
Family Law Reform Act, 1969, c. 46, § 21(3)(b).
201
Melanie Roberts, Children By Donation: Do They Have A Claim to Their Genetic
Parentage?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD LAW 47, 53–54 (Jo Bridgeman & Daniel
Monk eds., 2000).
202
Smart, supra note 30, at 398; Compare Re H and A (Paternity: Blood Tests) [2002]
EWCA (Civ) 383, [2002] 1 F.L.R. 1145, [29], with Re F (A Minor) (Blood Tests: Paternity
Rights) [1993] Fam. 314 (ruling that since the applicant’s association with the mother had
ceased before the birth of the child, parental responsibility or contact orders were unlikely to
be made and an order for blood tests would achieve no more than a theoretical declaration of
paternity, the benefit of which would be outweighed by the risk of disruption to the child’s
family unit as a result of such tests).
203
Smart, supra note 30, at 398.
198
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genetic origins.204 Many felt this recognition of children’s rights was
necessary as it gave children protection against adult distortions of the truth
and offered children significant legal rights in relation to their parents in
these difficult cases.205
The rights-based argument is not based on subjective and changing
normative values on the child’s welfare, but on a universal claim to justice
for every generation through aligning legal and “physical” truth.206 The
argument claims to defend children’s rights against nondisclosure and “webs
of deceit,” and, at least at first, it seems that this argument is uncontestable:
children would be treated unjustly if they were not permitted to know the
truth of their genetic origins.207
In England, the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 further influenced
the law in favor of the right to know under Article 8.208 Previously, in 1984,
the Commission of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology,
chaired by Baroness Warnock, recommended that donor-conceived children
be deemed legitimate and that donors have no parental rights or duties.209
Although the Warnock Committee was concerned about the secrecy
surrounding donor children’s conception, donor anonymity was still
entrenched in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.210 Under
the Act, if a woman is married at the time of the artificial insemination of
sperm, even if the resulting embryo was not created using the sperm of her
husband, the husband is treated as the father of the child, unless he shows
that he did not consent to the insemination.211 Thus, the common law
presumption of legitimacy applies even in the absence of consent, and the
child will be regarded as the legitimate child of the mother’s husband unless
refuted.212 However, in Rose v. Secretary of State for Health, the court
upheld the claims of a donor-conceived woman to knowledge regarding the
identity of her father.213 These arguments would ultimately influence the
heated debates that led to legislation ending the anonymity of men who
donate sperm to fertility clinics in England.214
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

Id. at 399.
Id.
Smart, supra note 96, at 553.
Id. at 554.
Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
DHSS REPORT, supra note 149, at 4.17.
HFEA 1990, supra note 98, § 28.
Id. § 28(2).
Id. § 28(5)(a).
[2002] EWHC (Admin) 1593, [2002] 2 F.L.R. 692, [47].
JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, paras. 268–271. Baroness Warnock, who
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2. Disclosure of Identity by Lesbian Couples to Their Donor-Inseminated
Children
Lesbian couples are deliberately establishing families without men as
partners or fathers,215 and to date there is no conclusive evidence that
children raised by lesbian parents from birth suffer developmental or
emotional problems in the absence of conventional fathers.216 Many lesbian
couples aspire to a version of family in which two equally co-parenting
mothers demonstrate that they have their child’s best interests at heart by not
making an irreversible decision about donor anonymity on behalf of that
child and also by allowing the formation of a “donor relationship.”217
Problematically, the biological father may perceive sperm contribution as the
means to form a relationship with a child, not solely contingent, as was
apparent for the co-parent and the mother, on fulfilling the demands of
“children’s right to know.”218
In England, the House of Lords has found the biological mother’s
contribution as the genetic, gestational, and psychological mother to be
unique from that of her lesbian partner, and has denied the lesbian partner the
status of primary caretaker.219 Despite lacking full recognition as the child’s
parent, legislatively, the position of the lesbian partner has been improved in
England. If, prior to the child’s birth, the lesbian partner becomes the
biological mother’s civil partner, she can apply for a Parental Responsibility
Order recognizing her as the child’s stepparent.220 Alternatively, if the
services of licensed clinics are used to conceive, then the lesbian partner is
chaired the 1984 Committee of Inquiry into Fertilisation and Embryology, stated that she now
supported the view that donor-conceived persons should have the same “right to know” as
adopted people. Call to End Sperm Donor Anonymity, BBC NEWS (May 14, 2002), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/1986683.stm. She based her argument on the greater awareness
and increasing sensitivity to genetic inheritance. Jess Buxton, Should Egg and Sperm Donors
Remain Anonymous?, BIONEWS (May 20, 2002), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_37624.
asp. This issue of donor anonymity was one of the most controversial in the parliamentary
debates leading to the removal of donor anonymity. DEP’T OF HEALTH, DONOR INFORMATION
CONSULTATION: PROVIDING INFORMATION ABOUT GAMETE OR EMBRYO DONORS para. 1.15
(2001), reprinted in 5 HUM. FERTILITY 97 (2002).
215
Kathryn Almack, Seeking Sperm: Accounts of Lesbian Couples’ Reproductive DecisionMaking and Understandings of the Needs of the Child, 20 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 1, 8
(2006).
216
Smith, supra note 9, at 237.
217
Id. The mother may assume that having lesbian parents automatically excludes a child
from the right to have contact with his or her biological father. Id.
218
Id.
219
Re G (Children) (Residence: Same Sex Partner), [2006] UKHL 43, [2006] 4 All E.R. 241.
220
Children Act, 1989, c. 41, § 3(1) (U.K.).
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normally treated as the child’s legal parent, whether or not the two women
have become civil partners.221 In cases where the biological mother’s lesbian
partner is treated as a legal parent, the sperm donor is barred from applying
for a Parental Responsibility Order.222 However, if a sperm donor donates
sperm to a lesbian couple under an informal arrangement not involving a
licensed clinic, the sperm donor may be able to obtain a Parental
Responsibility Order.223 In some cases the courts have refused to grant him
parental responsibility on the grounds that he would undermine the
autonomy of the lesbian family unit,224 which often has concepts of
“mother,” “father,” “parent,” and “donor” that challenge legal definitions.225
More often, however, lesbian couples are legally vulnerable and, therefore,
do not have the ability to determine the biological father’s rights to a legal
relationship with his child or the extent of the donor father’s inclusion in the
family unit with the children and their “mothers.”226
Although most lesbian couples do not intend for a known donor to have a
parental relationship with the donor-conceived child since they regard
themselves as parents, they acknowledge the child’s right to know the
identity of his biological father.227 Unlike heterosexual couples utilizing
artificial insemination, lesbian couples do not face male infertility and the
resulting reluctance to discuss issues associated with it. Also, unlike
heterosexual couples that can hide the fact that a donor child is not
genetically related to his father, lesbian couples will eventually have to
answer their children’s questions about the absence of a male parent. Thus,
221

HFEA 2008, supra note 98, § 43.
Id. § 54(1). Under the Child Support Act 1991, donors may also be liable for
maintenance for any children born as a result of a known donor arrangement. Almack, supra
note 215, at 5.
223
Re D (Contact and Parental Responsibility: Lesbian Mother and Known Father), [2006]
EWHC (Fam) 2, [2006] 1 F.C.R. 556, [93].
224
Re B (Role of Biological Father), [2007] EWHC (Fam) 1952, [2008] 1 F.L.R. 1015.
225
See Almack, supra note 215, at 11–13 (listing descriptions of family used by lesbians
who have conceived through donor conception).
226
See Re Patrick (An Application Concerning Contract) [2002] 28 Fam LR 579 (Austl.).
This case was the first time an Australian court was required to give judgment on the kinship
status of a child of a homosexual who had contributed his sperm to a lesbian biological mother
by donor insemination outside a clinical setting. Dempsey, supra note 196, at 78. It is
apparent that lesbian and homosexuals may have very different concepts of such a
relationship. Id. The father could not conceive of himself as a “known donor” but only as a
father. Id. at 88.
227
Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman’s Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call
for an Expanded Definition of Family 4 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 33 (1981) (noting that
artificial insemination gives lesbian women a chance to have a child without involving a man,
and an opportunity to raise the child with a partner in a unit of two ‘parents’).
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among lesbian parents, rates of disclosure to their children, or plans to
disclose, tend to be almost 100%.228 Thus, regarding disclosures, donor
children of lesbian couples are arguably unfairly advantaged in relation to
children born to heterosexual parents who are unlikely to have a social
trigger obviating disclosure.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is undoubtedly a growing trend toward openness in the field of
gamete donation. Arguments are already being formulated that children not
only should know about donor kin, but also should have relationships with
them on the basis of the analogy of adoption.229 There are also websites that
make it possible for children born from sperm donation to learn the identity
of their genetic or donor parents.230 Even in cases of anonymous donation it
is becoming possible for curious older children to discover the identity of a
donor parent.231
Fundamentally, it is arguable that the right to know underlies the principle
of decisional privacy, which is the basis of the right to private life.232
228

J.E. Sheib et al., Choosing Identity-Release Sperm Donors: The Parents’ Perspective 13–
18 Years Later, 18 HUM. REPROD. 1115, 1117 (2003). In Australia, the Victorian model of
clinical donor insemination requires that sperm donors supply identifying information that can
be made available to adult offspring on request, satisfies the desire for the autonomous two
parent “homo-nuclear” family that many lesbians prefer as well as the strong belief many
prospective lesbian parents display in support of the principle of children’s “right to know.”
Dempsey, supra note 196, at 98.
229
See generally Julie Wallbank, Too Many Mothers? Surrogacy, Kinship and the Welfare
of the Child, 10 MED. L. REV. 271 (2002) (arguing this in relation to surrogacy on the grounds
that the gestational mother in a surrogacy arrangement should be regarded as just as much a
mother as the commissioning mother and that it is likely to be harmful to the child to be
denied contact with the gestational mother).
230
See, e.g., ACEBABES, http://www.infertilitynetworkuk.com/acebabes/ (last visited Feb.
21, 2012) (providing support to families using assisted conception); UK DONORLINK,
http://www.ukdonorlink.org.uk/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012) (a pilot voluntary contact register
linking donors and donor-conceived children).
231
Alison Motluk, Anonymous Sperm Donor Traced on Internet, NEWSCIEINTIST, Nov. 3,
2005, at 6. In 2005, a teenager tracked down his biological father using a mail-order DNA kit
and online search engines. The donor concerned had contracted with the fertility clinic to
remain anonymous. The teenager had very little access to information, except the date and
place of the man’s birth, but took a swab of the inside of his cheek and mailed it to an online
genealogy DNA-testing service. Having acquired the date and place of the donor’s birth, the
teenager managed to trace his biological father. Id.
232
See Mikulic v. Croatia, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 54 (“The Court has held that respect
for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as
individual human beings and that an individual’s entitlement to such information is of
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Biological parentage may be considered one aspect of a person’s fixed
identity and an immutable quality. The notion of decisional privacy suggests
that people should, in principle, have free choice when interpreting their
fixed identity—a right to informational self-determination. Arguably, the
existence of the right to know is not a matter based on concern for individual
emotional welfare, because there is not enough evidence available as to
whether it conduces to an individual’s welfare to have such knowledge.
Instead, the concept is based on the proposition that no one has the right to
decide on another person’s behalf whether that other person should or should
not be able to know about their own genetic history.233 Even if this
informational self-determination is considered to be partially socially
constructed and only pressing as a result of the adoption movement and biomedical developments it defies historical interpretation and is immutable.
However, arguments opposing the blanket assertion of such a right take
into account the majority of donor conception cases, in which there is a
social father and a recognized family unit that appears, in the case of the
heterosexual family, to be otherwise “normal,” stable, and ready to embrace
a much-longed-for child. Such families are anxious not to disturb that
stability. They also argue that the donor-conceived child’s right to know in
such cases conflicts with the rights to autonomy and privacy of the mother,
the “social” father, and the gamete donor. In this sphere, placing greater
pressure on social parents via a legal responsibility to disclose a donorconceived child’s biological origins could constitute not only an invasion of
the parents’ privacy rights, but also a moralizing circumstance entirely
insensitive to the parents’ situation at the time of conception, especially in
view of the fact that the parents may risk social ostracism in some societies if
they disclose the information surrounding their child’s birth.
It may be difficult for a donor-conceived child to conceptualize a genetic
donor purely in terms of biological inheritance and not as a social father.234
Conversely, a biological father who enters the donor-conceived child’s life
may have more than merely a psychological role; instead their biological
connection may, and perhaps should, become a factor in donor–child
relationships that arise. Ultimately, more research is needed before firm
conclusions can be made about the role of fathers in such donor-conceived
families.

importance because of its formative implications for his or her personality.”).
233
Memorandum by David Gollancz (Ev 44), in JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE HUMAN TISSUE
AND EMBRYOS (DRAFT) BILL, VOLUME II: EVIDENCE, 2006–7, H.L. 169-II, at 366 (U.K.).
234
Grace et al., supra note 114, at 312.
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Infertility success rates continue to rise as medical technologies
advance.235 Donor-conceived children enrich the lives of many who would
have been infertile in another era, giving such parents the opportunity to raise
much-desired children who are genetically related to one parent. But this
opportunity is threatened by the removal of anonymity. For example, the
removal of donor anonymity in England has caused some frustration and
despair.236 There is a possibility that fewer children will be conceived if
social parents become hesitant about using this method of conception and the
pool of regulated sperm donors diminishes for fear of lost privacy.237
Given the fact that the CRC was not drafted with sperm donation in mind,
there is no clear answer in regard to the child’s right to know in the donor
conception context.238 It is suggested that legislation mandating disclosure
of donor status is not the solution, but rather a balancing test should be
formulated involving all competing interests.239 Ultimately, a holistic
approach that takes into account the best interests of the entire family, rather
than narrowly focusing on fulfilling the rights of donor-conceived children to
access information about the identity of their biological fathers is required.
Such a narrow focus may not benefit any of the parties in the long run.240 A
holistic approach would take account of the psychological complexities of
donor conception, as well as the fact that mandatory donor identification
statutes do not lead immediately to greater disclosure by parents, but rather
to dramatic dips in sperm supplies leading to the escalation of undesirable
“reproductive tourism.”241
It is therefore suggested that a gradual process which gently nudges the
process toward greater transparency is more desirable in this area. The
movement toward greater openness would be facilitated by the removal of
the stigma of infertility and a greater sensitivity by donor parents to the needs
of their offspring. This will bring about disclosure conducive to the welfare
of children and the stability of all families involved. The blunt instrument of
235

NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2009 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS
RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 65 (2009).
236
See Lucy Frith et al., UK Gamete Donors’ Reflections on the Removal of Anonymity:
Implications for Recruitment, 22 HUM. REPROD. 1675, 1676–77 (2007) (explaining the
apprehension caused by the removal of donor anonymity in the U.K.).
237
Id.
238
Frith, supra note 74, at 821; see also Report on Human Artificial Procreation, supra note
51 (calling for anonymity of gamete donors unless national law provides otherwise).
239
Sauer, supra note 128, at 954.
240
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241
Waldman, supra note 12, at 555.
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legislative enforcement requiring disclosure of genetic origins of donorconceived persons is not recommended in this area nor is it necessitated by
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights or a careful
interpretation of the CRC.

